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Abstract
We assess if and how motherhood wage penalties change in response to the design of parental leave
regulations. Focusing on Germany, we compare sweeps of reforms inspired by opposite principles.
One allowed for longer periods out of paid work in the 1990s, the other prompted quicker re-entry in
the labour market in the late 2000s. These reforms may have first exacerbated and later mitigated
wage losses for new mothers, albeit each component of leave schemes may trigger separate, and at
times zero-sum, mechanisms. We rely on Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) data and a difference-in-
differences design. Focusing on first-time mothers, we find that motherhood wage penalties were
substantial (around 20–30 per cent of pre-birth wages) and also changed little during the 1990s. As
parental leave reform triggered longer time spent on leave coupled with better tenure accumulation,
wage losses for mothers remained stable in this first period. Following parental leave reform in the
late 2000s, instead, the wage prospects of first-time mothers improved, thanks in part to shorter work
interruptions and increased work hours. We suggest that the nuts and bolts of leave schemes can be
fine-tuned to reduce child penalties and, thus, gender wage disparities.
Introduction
Mothers typically face wage losses when reprising paid
work after having a child. Such a motherhood wage pen-
alty has become a key component of gender pay gaps in
labour markets, but its size and roots are still debated
(for a review, Ponthieux and Meurs, 2015). Women’s la-
bour supply patterns, particularly work interruptions
for family-related reasons, account for at least part of
the wage dip (Albrecht et al., 1999; Gupta and Smith,
2002; Gangl and Ziefle, 2009; Adda, Dustmann and
Stevens, 2017). Work interruptions are in turn influ-
enced by leave policies and reforms to those policies
over time (Gregg, Gutı́errez-Domenech and Waldfogel,
2007; Lalive and Zweimüller, 2009; Ziefle and Gangl,
2014; Baum and Ruhm, 2016). Few studies, however,
have questioned if and how motherhood wage penalties
may change in relation to leave reform.
We address these questions here, focusing on two
decades of German reforms (e.g. Schönberg and
Ludsteck, 2014; Ziefle and Gangl, 2014; Kluve and
Schmitz, 2018). Germany offers an exemplary case
study for it once encompassed a maternalist leave
scheme among the longest and most generous in high-
income countries, and has now shifted to provisions
similar to those of Scandinavian countries (Ray,
Gornick and Schmitt, 2010). Germany also features one
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of the largest motherhood penalties and gender pay
gaps in international comparison (e.g. Olivetti and
Petrongolo, 2008; Gangl and Ziefle, 2009), with far-
reaching consequences on intra-household equilibria
(Musick, Bea and Gonalons-Pons, 2019), on the
opportunity-cost of children amidst Germany’s fertility
decline (Buhr and Huinink, 2015), and on gender eco-
nomic disparities along the lifecycle (OECD, 2017: p.
173; see also, Lersch, Jacob and Hank, 2017).
Relying on high-quality panel data from the Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP 1985–2014), we make two main
contributions. First, we show that wage penalties might
be larger than what existing estimates suggest (e.g.
Cukrowska-Torzewska and Matysiak, 2020; de Linde
Leonard and Stanley, 2020), up to 20–30 per cent of
pre-birth wages. Previous studies largely averaged wage
losses across all periods after the birth of a child. We dis-
tinguish these periods in an event-study framework and
suggest that this assumption might be unwarranted,
with implications for the size and, hence, for the societal
relevance of motherhood wage penalties.
Second, we show that child penalties can change
over time, exploiting two major parental leave reforms.
In doing so, we argue that the ‘nuts and bolts’ of leave
policy—duration, job protection rights, sharing rights
between partners, etc.—might trigger distinct, and at
times zero-sum, mechanisms. We find that German re-
form in 1992 prolonged women’s work interruptions,
hardly changed their working hours after re-entry, but
improved their accumulation of job tenure thanks to
job-guarantee rights. This resulted in large yet stable
wage losses, that substantially improved only after the
latest reform in 2007. In fact, we can no longer detect
(large) penalties for mothers after 2007, a finding we im-
pute to shorter career breaks and longer hours upon re-
entry—both plausibly aided by new leave-sharing rights
for partners.
Previous studies have either inferred the importance
of institutions by comparing the magnitude of wage loss
across countries (Davies and Pierre, 2005; Gangl and
Ziefle, 2009) or by investigating change over time in a
single country in relation to changing bundles of work–
family policies (Petersen, Penner and Høgsnes, 2014).
Others have highlighted robust associations between
child penalties and leave policies, but only focusing on
leave length and only across countries (Budig, Misra and
Boeckmann, 2016). Our study complements these, sug-
gesting that leave policy can shape motherhood wage
penalties, over time and within a single country, albeit
much depends on policy design. In line with few others
in the field (Andersen, 2018), we suggest that in-depth
consideration of policies and their effects can further
advance our understanding of the roots of child penal-
ties. Our findings inform existing debates on the conse-
quences of work–family policies (e.g. Ruhm, 1998;
Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Arulampalam, Booth and
Bryan, 2007; Mandel, 2012; Aisenbrey and Fasang,
2017) and on German parental leave in particular (e.g.
Schönberg and Ludsteck, 2014; Ziefle and Gangl, 2014;
Cygan-Rehm, 2016; Raute, 2019), both of which have
overlooked motherhood wage penalties.
Background
Parental Leave Reforms and Maternal Labour
Supply
Maternity leave in Germany has long covered a period
of 14 weeks with full income replacement and job pro-
tection. Parental leave, on the other hand, has been sub-
ject to two sweeps of reforms, one during the 1980s–
1990s and culminating in 1992, and another during the
2000s and culminating in 2007. Reforms variously rede-
signed the scheme with respect to its duration, job-
guarantee rights (i.e. to return to a comparable job with
the pre-birth employer after taking leave), payments,
and sharing rights between partners.
Prior to 1986, employed (West) German mothers
could access up to 6 months of paid and job-guaranteed
parental leave. A number of reforms progressively
increased the duration of the job guarantee. Most strik-
ingly, such duration was doubled in 1992, from 18 to
36 months. In the meantime, benefits also changed,
switching from earnings-related to a mix of flat-rate and
means-tested payments. Payments became available to
all mothers regardless of pre-birth employment status
(1986), for up to 12 months since 1992 and 24 months
since 1993. In short, early reform granted long spells of
paid leave, with extensive job protection rights.
In contrast, reforms in the 2000s sought to make
shorter work interruptions more financially appealing,
with the aim of fostering, at once, paid work and family
formation. In 2001, mothers returning to paid work
after 12 months of leave, rather than 24, could have ac-
cess to a larger payment (flat-rate, 450 EUR). Parents,
maintaining their eligibility intact, could also work up
to 30 hours a week while on leave—in contrast to the
19-hour limit in place prior to 2001. The 2007 reform
(Elternzeitgesetz) went further, limiting paid leave to
12 months, or 14 when each parent takes at least 2
months. Benefits are now earnings-related once again,
with a replacement rate of around 67 per cent of the
pre-birth net labour earnings and a cap at 1,800 euros a
month. Parents who are not in employment in the year
prior to childbirth are entitled to a minimum of 300
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euros a month, similar to the pre-2007 regime. Quite
importantly, the job-guarantee period remained un-
changed throughout. In short, reforms in the 1980s/
1990s broadened benefit receipt and extended the job
guarantee to allow mothers a prolonged absence from
paid work. Reforms in the 2000s squeezed more gener-
ous benefits in shorter periods of benefit receipt with the
explicit aim of maintaining mothers in employment (see
also Kluve and Tamm, 2013; Schönberg and Ludsteck,
2014; Ziefle and Gangl, 2014).
According to previous studies, the introduction or
expansion of paid leaves may lead to sharp reductions in
women’s employment probability right after childbirth
(e.g. Gregg, Gutı́errez-Domenech and Waldfogel, 2007;
Lalive and Zweimüller, 2009). In the long run, however,
paid leaves may exert positive effects on job continuity
and increase the share of women returning to the labour
market when entitlements expire (e.g. Baker and
Milligan, 2008; Schönberg and Ludsteck, 2014; Baum
and Ruhm, 2016). In Germany, parental leave reform
has been found to neatly shape the short-term labour
supply of mothers (Schönberg and Ludsteck, 2014;
Ziefle and Gangl, 2014). After 1992, the median length
of leave periods in the West rose to 27 months and
returns started peaking also at 36 months, coinciding
with the exhaustion of job-protection rights. In the East,
mothers responded similarly to policy change, albeit to a
lesser extent given historically superior female labour
force participation. Early reforms particularly depressed
mothers’ short-run chances of working full-time
(Schönberg and Ludsteck, 2014; Arntz, Dlugosz and
Wilke, 2017). Part-time employment conversely became
the norm for mothers returning to paid work, particular-
ly in former West Germany and, to a lesser extent but in-
creasingly over time, in the former East too (Trappe,
Pollmann-Schult and Schmitt, 2015; Dieckhoff et al.,
2016). Although around half of returners maintained
their pre-birth employer in the aftermath of 1992, the
share of returners with a new employer and that of those
having a second child out of inactivity also increased
(Arntz, Dlugosz and Wilke, 2017). Yet, in the long run,
the impact of parental leave expansion on mothers’
accumulated labour market experience was modest
(Schönberg and Ludsteck, 2014; see also Lalive and
Zweimüller, 2009 for similar conclusions on leave ex-
pansion in Austria). Reforms seemingly accentuated
positive selection into employment, as employment (and
job) continuity after motherhood became even more
skewed in favour of highly educated women (Drasch,
2012; Arntz, Dlugosz and Wilke, 2017).
In the midst of and contributing to rising female la-
bour market participation, parental leave reforms in the
2000s lead to a reversal in maternal labour supply in the
first years after childbirth. While evidence is mixed on
the role of the 2001 reform (cf. Fitzenberger,
Sommerfeld and Steffes, 2013; Ziefle and Gangl, 2014),
the 2007 reform seems to have fuelled strong labour
supply responses. Consistent evidence in the literature
indeed points to increased time spent off work in the
first year after childbirth—that is, during paid leave—
coupled though with higher re-employment chances and
longer working hours after the 12-month mark, when
payments expire (Kluve and Tamm, 2013; Ziefle and
Gangl, 2014; Bergemann and Riphahn, 2017; Kluve and
Schmitz, 2018). Still, long-run maternal labour force
participation was largely unaffected by the new regime
and women’s higher propensity to reprise working part-
time rather than full-time, as well as the ‘high-skill
skew’ among employed mothers, have persisted
(Drasch, 2012; Bergemann and Riphahn, 2017; Kluve
and Schmitz, 2018).
Overall, parental leave reform triggered longer short-
term dips in the labour supply of mothers, and these
dips significantly shortened only in the late 2000s.
Throughout, selective return and part-time work
remained common among new mothers. The extension
of the job guarantee in 1992 and the reform of the bene-
fit scheme in 2007 have been identified as the two water-
shed reforms with respect to the labour supply
behaviour of German mothers (Kluve and Tamm, 2013;
Ziefle and Gangl, 2014; Bergemann and Riphahn, 2017;
see also Fitzenberger, Sommerfeld and Steffes, 2013;
Gangl and Ziefle, 2015). In the remainder, we will thus
focus on these two reforms. For a summary, we portray
the reforms’ key features, in terms of duration, benefit
receipt, and job protection, in Figure 1.
Wage Responses to Parental Leave Reform
Parental leave regulations may affect wages via several
mechanisms. From a human capital perspective, leaves,
and wage attainment are linked both at the extensive
and at the intensive margin of labour supply. At the ex-
tensive margin, expanding the duration of parental
leaves might exacerbate motherhood wage penalties.
Prolonged leave uptake can lead to human capital loss
and skill atrophy. This may result in lower wage offers
for mothers returning to paid work after taking leave
(Gupta and Smith, 2002; Anderson, Binder and Krause,
2003; Adda, Dustmann and Stevens, 2017). Conversely,
if leaves grant job-protected work interruptions, job ten-
ure (and, thus, firm-specific human capital) can be pre-
served and motherhood wage penalties could be offset
(Waldfogel, 1998; Baker and Milligan, 2008; Zhang,
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2010; Fernández-Kranz, Lacuesta and Rodrı̀guez-
Planas, 2013).
Hence, it is unclear whether the 1992 reform made
wage penalties worse. On the one hand, it doubled leave
duration with the risk of intensifying human capital
loss. On the other hand, though, the reform extended
job-guarantee rights to 36 months, and this may have
helped mothers maintain their tenure with their pre-
birth employer. The impact of the 2007 reform is more
clear-cut. Shorter benefit duration incentivized mothers
to concentrate leave uptake in the first 12 months after
childbirth, and then resume employment, thereby miti-
gating wage losses.
At the intensive margin, parental leaves can affect wages
via working hours. Part-time employment has long been the
modal arrangement after taking leave in (West) Germany
(e.g. Trappe, Pollmann-Schult and Schmitt, 2015;
Dieckhoff et al., 2016). This can depress hourly wages im-
mediately upon re-entry, but comparative research has
shown that part-time jobs are relatively well-paid in
Germany (Bardasi and Gornick, 2008) and are associated
with lower wage rates only for very short schedules (5–
15 hours, Paul, 2016). Nevertheless, wage returns to experi-
ence are typically inferior in part-time (vs full-time) employ-
ment, regardless of the ‘intensity’ of part-time and to the
detriment of wage attainment in the long run (Fernández-
Kranz, Paul and Rodrı̀guez-Planas , 2015; Paul, 2016).
Mothers subject to the 1992 regulations have been
shown to display stronger preferences for family com-
mitments over paid work (Gangl and Ziefle, 2015). This
could have translated in effort re-allocation, manifesting
in shorter work hours and low wages. In contrast, the
2007 reform spurred re-entries with longer hours, albeit
still predominantly within part-time schedules (e.g.
Kluve and Schmitz, 2018). New mandates for fathers
may have played a role in this respect (Bünning, 2015),
freeing time for mothers to work longer hours and there-
by improving their wage prospects (see e.g. Andersen,
2018), at least in the short run.
Alternative to a human capital perspective, it could
be that employers interpret changes in maternal behav-
iours and preferences as market signals. Given that leave
uptake is widespread among mothers, leave length may
serve as a signal (Albrecht et al., 1999; Albrecht,
Thoursie and Vroman, 2015; Evertsson, 2016). The
price of taking family leave may spike if women stay out
more than what is statutorily granted or if—given the
choice—they spread their leave period rather than ex-
haust it all at once. These might be perceived as signals
of low commitment to the job or employment in general.
Coherently, research has highlighted a significant jump
in the wage penalty for leaves exceeding the job-
guaranteed period of 36 months in Germany in the years
1994–2005 (Buligescu et al., 2009). Similar ‘threshold
Figure 1. Summary of the relevant changes to benefit receipt and job guarantee periods under different parental leave regulations
Note: the year k¼ 1 refers to the year prior to the birth of a new child for a given woman.
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effects’ have been shown to hold also in other
countries (Albrecht, Thoursie and Vroman, 2015;
Evertsson, 2016). Signalling may thus generate hetero-
geneity in the effects of each reform. In the midst of a
general drift towards longer career interruptions after
1992, mothers taking shorter leaves could have positive-
ly signalled themselves to employers, perhaps avoiding a
(more) negative wage shock. In contrast, women could
have sent adverse signals by not complying with the new
12-month interruption norm after 2007 (e.g. Bergemann
and Riphahn, 2017), resulting in wage penalties also
under the new leave regime.
In sum, human capital accounts provide only mixed
indications for the effects of the 1992 reform, due to the
combination of long work interruptions, extensive job
protection, and short hours. The 2007 reform, on the
other hand, may have improved the wage prospects of
mothers in the short run, thanks to more concentrated
leave breaks and longer hours. Extensive part-time
work, if sustained, might still lead to wage deterioration
though. For both reforms, signalling predicts instead dis-
continuities in the wage penalty, depending on the tim-
ing of mothers’ return to work vis-à-vis leave
‘thresholds’. Time spent on leave (human capital/signal-
ling), working hours (human capital), and job tenure
(human capital) are thus the proxies (mechanisms) we




We use longitudinal data from the German SOEP (v.
31.1, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW),
Berlin, 2016), a multipurpose household panel survey
carried out annually since 1984 (Goebel et al., 2018).
We rely on samples A–K (with the exception of the
Innovation Sample I), that is, all original samples for
both West and East Germany as well as refreshment and
boost samples added up to 2012.
We ran separate analyses for the two reform periods.
To evaluate the extension of the job guarantee in 1992
(Reform 1, hereafter), we focus on the period between
1985 and 1998. To examine the change in the benefit
scheme carried out in 2007 (Reform 2, hereafter), we se-
lect the subsequent time window between 1999 and
2014. The choice of these thresholds allows us to have
periods of equal length prior and after each reform (see
e.g. Francesconi and Van der Klaauw, 2007). The two
midpoints, 1992 and 2007, respectively, fit precisely
with the culmination points of each sweep of reforms, as
previously discussed. The extensiveness of the time win-
dow is also motivated by the specificity of the treatment
effects we are investigating (e.g. Ziefle and Gangl,
2014). Since women may take up to 3 years of parental
leave from 1992 onwards, and since we necessarily
measure their post-birth wages only once they returned
to the labour market anyway, we need to allow (enough)
women in our sample to make such re-entry in paid
work.
Following conventional practices in the literature,
our sample is restricted to women aged 16–45, working
as dependent employees, with at least two valid observa-
tions for any of our outcome variables, and with non-
missing information on all other variables involved in
the analysis. To fully reconstruct women’s fertility biog-
raphies, we take advantage of data from the Biography
and Life History module of SOEP (Goebel, 2017). We
are thus able to build on info on the timing of childbirth
events, precise to the month and available up to the 15th
parity.
We define the group treated by the policy change as
those women who become mothers for the first time be-
tween 1992 and 1998 for Reform 1 and between 2007
and 2014 for Reform 2. The control group1 in each case
also comprises first-time mothers, who have given birth
for the first time between 1985 and 1991 for Reform 1,
and between 1999 and 2006 for Reform 2. To avoid
overlaps between the two treatment arms, mothers
belonging to each control group did not give birth to a
child in the respective post-reform periods and are thus
unaffected by parental leave reforms2 We also drop all
person-year records past the fifth year after childbirth
due to the small sample size for k 6. Finally, women
who do not give birth in either observation period are
not part of the analyses. This choice is, nonetheless,
largely inconsequential for our estimates (see
Supplementary Section A5).
We are thus left with 706 women (of which 462 are
treated) for the evaluation of Reform 1 and 1,017
women (of which 494 are treated) for Reform 2, fol-
lowed for an average of 5.6 and 6.2 waves, respectively.
These numbers are comparable to those of previous re-
search on parental leave effects on labour supply and
earnings (e.g. Joseph et al., 2013; Bergemann and
Riphahn, 2017).
Estimating the Effects of Parental Leave Reforms
We implement a difference-in-differences (DiD) design,
augmented by entropy balancing (Hainmueller, 2012)
and individual fixed effects (FE) (as in, e.g. Francesconi
and Van der Klaauw, 2007; Gangl and Ziefle, 2015).
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These add-ons have several advantages. First, weighting
our estimates via entropy balancing improves the com-
parability of mothers in each ‘treatment-control’ pair, at
least on the basis of a set of observable characteristics.
The latter are variables tapping into women’s work
histories and household characteristics; we present the
procedure in full in Supplementary Section A2. By
including individual FEs, we remove bias due to com-
positional differences across groups due to time-
invariant unobserved characteristics, as long as these
have constant wage returns (implied by the ‘fixed’
effect).
These choices arguably enhance internal validity, yet
several assumptions are still needed to grant a causal in-
terpretation to our findings. Broadly speaking, these
concern if and to what extent our estimates are shielded
from confounding bias and sample selection bias. We
discuss these at length in Supplementary Sections A2
and A4, and provide evidence supporting the robustness
of our approach. With this in mind, estimation involves




bk  1½t ¼ k þ
Xk¼5
k¼0
ck  1½t ¼ k Di þXith
þ /i þ eit
(1)
where the dependent variable yit is the log of real hourly
wages for an individual i in calendar year t. Hourly
wages are derived from gross monthly labour income, as
reported by SOEP respondents who are currently
employed with reference to the month prior to the inter-
view. This is then divided by the amount of actual week-
ly working hours multiplied by 4.35 (the approximate
number of weeks in a month). If actual working time is
not available, we substitute for it by taking the sum of
contractual working hours and overtime (Kühhirt and
Ludwig, 2012). Wages are then logged and indexed at
2014 consumer prices. Person-year observations were
dropped when real hourly wage values were smaller
than 1 or bigger than 100, to reduce the influence of out-
liers on our estimates. As per Equation 1, we draw on an
event-study specification to study the effect of mother-
hood on wages before and after a given reform (e.g.
Borusyak and Jaravel, 2016; Kleven, Landais and
Søgaard, 2018; Kuziemko et al., 2018). In a nutshell,
what we aim to retrieve is the average wage loss for a
given woman, in each year after giving birth as com-
pared to her average wage prior to giving birth. These
are estimates of the total motherhood wage penalty after
first birth. We want to further contrast these estimates
of the motherhood wage penalty across groups of
women who became mothers prior to and after parental
leave reform.
Each year of interview t after first childbirth is named
k and a corresponding ‘event-time’ dummy is included
in the model (i.e. 1[t¼k]). These dummies cover the
post-birth period, from the first interview after the child
was born (Year 0) to the sixth interview in its aftermath
(Year 5). We first estimate the motherhood penalty for
each year after the birth of the first child for the control
group (bk). We then take the product of these event-time
dummies and our treatment dummy Di, the latter sepa-
rating women in the treated group (coded as 1) from
women in the control group (the reference, coded 0).
This product gives us the difference in the motherhood
penalty (ck) between treated and controls, that is, the
average effect of parental leave reform on the treated.
Such effect ck should be regarded as an intention-to-
treat estimate, given that we do not explicitly model par-
ental leave receipt. This holds particularly for Reform 1,
as benefit receipt became rather universal in the after-
math of Reform 2 (e.g. Schönberg and Ludsteck, 2014;
Raute, 2019).
To grant an easier first approach to our results, we
sum these latter coefficients ck to the respective bk for
each year after first childbirth. This sum gives us the esti-
mated motherhood penalty for the treated, and we can
readily contrast this to the motherhood penalty for the
controls. Full estimates can be found in Supplementary
Section A3. Two aspects of our design are worth stress-
ing. First, we omit the ‘main effect’ of the treatment
dummy Di. Belonging to one or the other treatment
group is a time-constant feature for each individual, and
as such this feature is already encompassed by individual
FEs /i. Yet product terms that involve time-constant
variables and time-varying ones can be estimated. We
can therefore retrieve our estimates of interest, the dif-
ferences in the motherhood effect across treatment
groups ck.
Second, year-specific sample sizes in years 0–5 vary
from a minimum of 30 women to a maximum of 279
women (Supplementary Table SA1). This may raise con-
cerns on whether our design is under-powered and with
what consequences for the credibility of our estimates
(e.g. Gelman and Carlin, 2014), an issue we explore fur-
ther in Supplementary Section A8. Even if under-
powered, we chose an event-study specification for one
main reason. We follow both studies on the wages of
German mothers (Ejrnæs and Kunze, 2013) and on the
motherhood wage penalty more broadly (e.g. Loughran
and Zissimopoulos, 2009; Fernández-Kranz, Lacuesta
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and Rodrı̀guez-Planas, 2013; Kleven, Landais and
Søgaard, 2018), who commonly suggest to disentangle
short, medium, and (if possible) long run effects of
motherhood on wages. As years go by since the event,
estimates may vary in magnitude as well as in the
amount of uncertainty that surrounds them. Simpler
approaches - e.g. a single dummy for before-after first
childbirth - would assume this heterogeneity away and
may provide severely biased estimates of the effect of
interest (for recent appraisals, see Borusyak and Jaravel,
2016; Imai and Kim, 2017; de Chaisemartin and
D’Haultfœuille, 2020).
Among variables in the vector Xit, we include a
quadratic for age, to net out pure lifecycle effects, and
dummies for region of residence. Individual FEs /iand
an idiosyncratic error term eitcomplete our preferred
specification. Robust standard errors are estimated to
account for the possibility of serial correlation in the dis-
turbance term. Finally, to investigate mechanisms, we
ran the same model displayed in Equation 1 on three
auxiliary outcomes. First, we track a woman’s uptake of
leave provisions by determining the share of months she
spent on leave in the year preceding the current inter-
view (e.g. Buligescu et al., 2009). Leave shares range
from 0, indicating that no time was spent on leave in the
year prior to the current interview, to 1, indicating that
a mother spent on leave all 12 calendar months in the
previous year. Importantly, we kept focusing on first
births only, meaning that leave uptake is set to 0 follow-
ing a higher-order parity. We look at leave share to as-
sess changing family-related career interruptions prior
and after each reform, for both the purpose of validating
our design with respect to the ample previous literature
on the topic and to look into the role of human capital
and signalling mechanisms in shaping motherhood wage
penalties. Also, given that leave share can be observed
regardless of whether a woman works or not, we use all
available person-year records belonging to the women
part of our sample (6,585 total person-year records for
Reform 1, 9,756 total person-year records for Reform
2). This further allows the comparison of our estimates
to those of prior research on the labour supply of moth-
ers (e.g. Schönberg and Ludsteck, 2014; Bergemann and
Riphahn, 2017).
For the intensive margin of labour supply, we focus on
changes in women’s weekly working hours. As for job
continuity, implicated by the job guarantee built in par-
ental leave provisions, our dependent variable is tenure
with the current employer. For these two latter out-
comes, which are observed only if a woman is in paid
work at a given point in time t, we stick to person-year
records in which women were employed similar to the
main models for wages.
Findings
Wage Responses
We start by examining the effects of motherhood on
wages before and after Reform 1, that is, parental leave
expansion in 1992. Figure 2 plots our estimates separ-
ately for those exposed to Reform 1 and their compari-
son group. The overarching pattern is that of a sizeable
motherhood penalty, stable over time. Women in the
control group, who gave birth to their first child prior to
1992, confront wage losses in the range of 14–30 per
cent of their pre-birth wages in all years except Year 1.
Similar, women treated by Reform 1 face a wage penalty
in the range of 15–23 per cent of their pre-birth wages.
Little differences are found, overall, between the two
groups of women, with the exception of Year 0 and,
more markedly, Year 1. In Year 0, control-group
women face a penalty of around 29 per cent, while the
penalty for treated women stops at around 15 per cent.
Women in the treated group could be positively signal-
ling themselves, as they forgo a larger job-guaranteed
leave compared to control-group women in the same
year. A similar pattern should hold in Year 1, yet we
find little evidence of a penalty for women in the control
group, whereas women exposed to Reform 1 report a
substantial wage loss of around 23 per cent of their pre-
birth wages. Evidence for positive signalling among
early returners is therefore mixed, in the aftermath of
Reform 1.
Figure 3 plots the wage effects of motherhood for
women affected by Reform 2, the latest major reform of
German parental leave (2007). We compare these esti-
mates to those for a comparison group of women who
became mothers prior to Reform 2. For this latter group,
wage penalties are only detected in the medium term, in
Year 2 after the birth of a child and onwards. Such wage
effects for control-group women range from around 7
per cent of pre-birth wages in Year 2 to around 21 per
cent in Year 4. For women giving birth for the first time
after Reform 2, on the other hand, wage losses cannot
be detected, also in the long run. In Years 4 and 5 after
first birth, in particular, we detect an improvement of
around 15–17 points in the wage effects of motherhood
in favour of the treated.
Our main findings thus point, first, to persistence
in the aftermath of Reform 1. Such persistence may
suggest that the negative wage effects of human cap-
ital loss and the positive wage effects of job
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continuity, both spurred by the expanded job guaran-
tee introduced by Reform 1, cancel each other out on
average. Evidence for Years 0 and 1 provides conflict-
ing indications on ‘positive’ signalling instead.
Mothers contributing to those estimates are ‘early
returners’, and even more so among the treated, given
the 36-month job guarantee instituted in 1992. Yet,
early returners among the treated face smaller penal-
ties than their counterparts in Year 0 (p¼ 0.10) and
harsher penalties in Year 1 (p < 0.01), offering mixed
evidence, at best, for positive signalling.
As for Reform 2, we can no longer detect a large
motherhood wage penalty for women under the new
parental leave benefit instituted in 2007. Nevertheless,
estimates across treated and controls do not statistically
differ from each other in the first years after childbirth,
but only later on. Coherent with a human capital argu-
ment, it could be that treated women reap the benefits
of shorter career breaks per effect of Reform 2.
Differently, in line with negative signalling arguments,
we would have expected a larger penalty in the years
long after first childbirth, as these latter comprise ‘late
returners’ that now defect the norm of reprising work
after 12 months of benefit receipt.3
Labour Supply Outcomes
To shed light on the wage effects of parental leave re-
form, we examine time spent on live, weekly working
hours, and job tenure (Figure 4, see also Supplementary
Section A3). We estimate the same model specification
used for hourly wages.
Results in the upper panel of Figure 4 are largely in
line with our expectations. We find that the expansion
of the job guarantee in 1992 lead to opposite effects on
leave uptake and tenure. The share of months spent on
Figure 2. FE estimates (95 per cent confidence intervals) of the motherhood wage penalty before and after Reform 1, across treat-
ment groups, and relative to event time (SOEP 1985–1998)
Figure 3. FE estimates (95 per cent confidence intervals) of the motherhood wage penalty before and after Reform 2, across treat-
ment groups, and relative to event time (SOEP 1999–2014)
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leave, as displayed in the top-left corner, increased for
women treated by Reform 1 as compared to the control
group. The increase for the treated is remarkable, with
women more than doubling their share of time spent on
leave in some years (e.g. Year 2; full estimates in
Supplementary Table SA3). These effects point to a
more prolonged use of parental leave after Reform 1, in
line with what has been widely documented in previous
studies (Schönberg and Ludsteck, 2014; Ziefle and
Gangl, 2014).
At the same time, looking at the top-right corner of
Figure 4, mothers subject to the expanded leave post-
1992 appear to be better off in terms of job tenure with
their current firm. Prior to 1992, in fact, mothers faced
a ‘tenure penalty’, possibly contributing to their wage
losses. If these women faced losses of around 1–2 years
of tenure per year after childbirth, we do not detect stat-
istically similar penalties for women treated by Reform
1. The effect of the reform are thus relatively large when
it comes to tenure (see Supplementary Table SA5),
whereas for working hours we find evidence of overall
stability over time. As per Figure 4, we find that
mothers, both exposed and unexposed to Reform 1, re-
duce their working hours of around 5–6 hours if return-
ing already in Year 0, and of around 11–14 hours in the
following years (see Supplementary Table SA4).
Our findings at the bottom of Figure 4 pertain to
Reform 2. For leave share, in the bottom-left corner,
changes across groups are mixed. We find little evidence
of change in Year 0 and a slight increase in the share of
time spent on leave for the treated in Year 1. In Years 2
and 3, though, women affected by Reform 2 are found
to reduce their time spent on leave. This is consistent
with previous research, highlighting a fuller use of leave
in the first 12 months covered by the new parental leave
benefit and a higher chance of return to paid work after
its expiration (Bergemann and Riphahn, 2017; Kluve
and Schmitz, 2018).
Opposite to Reform 1, we further find somewhat of a
relative improvement in the working hours of mothers,
but not in their post-birth tenure after Reform 2 (see also
Supplementary Tables SA8 and SA9). Consistent with past
evidence (Kluve and Schmitz, 2018), we find that mothers
affected by the 2007 leave benefit log more hours of work
Figure 4. FE estimates (95 per cent confidence intervals) of motherhood ffects on (i) leave share, (ii) working hours, and (iii) tenure
(SOEP 1985–2014)
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than their counterparts, especially in Year 1. Still,
employed mothers reduce their working hours substantial-
ly even under the new scheme, with no change across
treatment groups detected in the medium term.
Other than resemblance to previous evidence on ma-
ternal labour supply, our findings in this section shed
light on the wage responses to parental leave reform.
First, we suggest that prolonged time on leave combined
with job-protection rights ultimately did not alter the
wage penalty experienced by German women in the
1990s (Gangl and Ziefle, 2009; Schönberg and
Ludsteck, 2014). Wage responses to long work interrup-
tions are typically negative, whilst preserving job tenure
might mitigate wage loss. The two forces might have
thus cancelled each other out, resulting in the persistence
of wage penalties for mothers in the aftermath of
Reform 1. Second, the increase in time spent on leave in
the immediate aftermath of childbirth might further ex-
plain why substantial wage penalties were found for the
treated by the 1992 reform also in Year 1. Conversely,
while time spent on leave increased also long after child-
birth, due to the expanded job guarantee, wage
responses are not consistent with negative signalling fur-
ther dampening down the wage of mothers in the me-
dium term. Substantial yet unchanging reductions in
working hours, last, might have underpinned wage pen-
alties both before and after Reform 1. We interpret this
as evidence that a change in the relative importance of
work versus family, spurred by Reform 1 (Gangl and
Ziefle, 2015), did not translate into changes in work
hours among employed women. Effort, as proxied by
work hours, had little consequences on the relative wage
prospects of women treated by Reform 1.
Moving on to Reform 2, evidence in Figure 4 might
account for the improvement in mothers’ wage rates via
shorter time spent on leave in the medium run and slight
increases in working hours. The wage effects of these la-
bour supply changes are more consistent with human
capital accounts than with signalling. If in line with sig-
nalling, indeed, we would have expected stronger
improvements in the wage penalty for those returning
early, and more evidence of a wage penalty when includ-
ing ‘late returners’ later on.
Robustness and Sensitivity Analyses
We performed a number of additional analyses to exam-
ine the robustness of our estimates with respect to model
assumptions, as well as to probe the sensitivity of our
estimates to specification and sample selection choices.
These analyses are reported and discussed more at
length in our Supplementary.
A first assumption that might be violated in our set-
ting is the absence of contemporaneous shocks to the
wages and labour supply of mothers. Relying on rela-
tively small sample numbers, we had to select long time
periods before and after a given reform, thereby increas-
ing the chance of co-occurring policy changes or period
effects. In Supplementary Section A4, we focus on con-
comitant childcare reforms. Childcare expansion in
1995, for one, might have improved the employment
rates of women exposed to Reform 1 in our study
(Bauernschuster and Schlotter, 2015). Restricting our
definition of treated and comparison groups to women
unlikely affected by this childcare reform does not
change our substantial conclusions with respect to
Reform 1. As for later efforts to expand childcare cover-
age, in 2005 and 2008, we could not perform similar
sample restrictions and retrieve statistically reliable esti-
mates. Recent appraisals of this new wave of childcare
expansion found larger positive labour supply effects for
the birth of a second child rather than the first (Zoch
and Hondralis, 2017). Our estimates, also in consider-
ation of previous research, centre around first parities
(see also Supplementary Section A6).
We also probed our models to the inclusion of year
FEs and of regional (East-West) unemployment rates to
account for shocks that may similarly hit the wages of
treated and control-group women. Two-way fixed
effects, with individual and year fixed effects, are in-
creasingly understood as biased when it comes to recov-
ering the treatment effect (of an event) of interest,
especially in the absence of a control group that never
experiences the event/treatment (e.g. Borusyak and
Jaravel, 2016; Imai and Kim, 2017; de Chaisemartin
and D’Haultfœuille, 2020). In the specification reported
in Supplementary Section A5, however, we augment our
samples by including childless women. This group, while
not experiencing the birth of a child by definition, may
aid the identification of other variables in our models,
including period effects. Our main findings are largely
unchanged.
In Supplementary Sections A6–A8 we explore
whether our findings are sensitive, respectively, to (i)
censoring observations after higher-order parities rather
than selecting only control-group women who had chil-
dren prior to a given reform, (ii) aggregating multiple
event-time periods rather than using year-by-year event-
time dummies, and (iii) adding a boost sample available
for the evaluation of Reform 2. All these additional
analyses aim at increasing statistical power with respect
to our main analyses, possibly accepting more bias in ex-
change for more variance. Results in these sections re-
inforce our main findings, pointing to stability after
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Reform 1 and a relative improvement in the wage effects
of motherhood following Reform 2. In this latter re-
spect, the lower bounds of our confidence intervals are
typically consistent with penalties of around 5–10 per
cent for those women treated by Reform 2.4 Hence,
even if wage estimates for treated women do not reach
conventional levels of statistical significance, we do not
suggest that the motherhood penalty has ‘vanished’ in
contemporary Germany.
Discussion and Conclusions
We have examined how motherhood wage penalties may
have responded to two distinct parental leave reforms in
Germany, with a focus on first-time mothers. From 1992
onwards, a maternalist leave scheme combined long peri-
ods of benefit receipt and even longer periods protected
by job-guarantee rights. These provisions further delayed
German women’s re-entry into the labour market. Yet
we find that longer time spent on leave coupled with
improved tenure with the current employer resulted in an
overall stable penalty, before and after 1992. Penalties
are larger than suggested in previous studies, up to 20–30
per cent of pre-birth wages. In contrast, since 2007,
German parental leave has featured a shorter, earnings-
related benefit, intact job-guarantee rights, and a bonus
of two months of benefit receipt usually taken up by
fathers. Per effect of this reform, we can no longer detect
(large) wage penalties for new mothers, who now concen-
trate their leave taking in their first years after childbirth
and also work longer hours upon re-entry.
Motherhood wage penalties can be large, justifying
intense academic and societal interest in their roots. We
suggest that an event-study design might provide more
faithful estimates of the size of such penalties, as com-
pared to studies focusing on ‘one-shot’ losses per child
(cf. Cukrowska-Torzewska and Matysiak, 2020; de
Linde Leonard and Stanley, 2020). A first limit of our
analyses, though, is that we rely on relatively small sam-
ple sizes. As a result, our analyses only examine
medium-term penalties and also assume homogeneity in
maternal wage effects within each group of ‘control’ or
‘treated’ women. Future studies adopting an event-study
framework could shed light on long-term penalties and
on further sources of heterogeneity across women. With
respect to the German context, more specifically, studies
should particularly assess heterogeneity depending on
education level/income. Previous research has shown
that highly educated/high-income women were the ‘win-
ners’ out of Reform 2 (Kluve and Schmitz, 2018;
Frodermann, Wrohlich and Zucco, 2020), yet we could
not go beyond ‘average’ penalties in this study.
Nevertheless, we show that child penalties can change
over time, and parental leave policies may play a role in
this regard. If granting our estimates a causal interpret-
ation, the right mix to reduce or even undo motherhood
wage penalties may consist of a relatively short leave,
with job-protection rights, and incentives to share leave
uptake so that women can work longer hours upon re-
entry. Our findings thus echo and update previous litera-
ture on best practices when designing leave schemes (e.g.
Waldfogel, 1998; Baker and Milligan, 2008). Results
also inform the larger debate on the consequences of
work–family policies, often found to foster women’s em-
ployment chances at the expense of their wages and car-
eer attainment (Ruhm, 1998; Mandel and Semyonov,
2006; Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan, 2007; Mandel,
2012; Aisenbrey and Fasang, 2017). In line with recent
studies (Mun and Jung, 2018), we suggest that perverse
effects largely depend on policy design. Examining the
‘nuts and bolts’ of any given policy in a single country
(e.g. Andersen, 2018) could nicely complement compara-
tive research on work–family bundles.
This in-depth focus can shed light on mechanisms trig-
gered by different components of a given policy, mecha-
nisms that can have zero-sum consequences (e.g. Reform
1). By and large, wages responses in our study are compat-
ible with a human capital account. We did not detect
sharp discontinuities as predicted by signalling theory, but
future studies could improve on our design in this respect
building on previous research (e.g. Evertsson, 2016). We
also overlooked demand-sided mechanisms, yet parental
leave provisions may contribute to statistical discrimin-
ation. Risk-averse employers may fear the costs of mater-
nal work interruptions, and pull down (up) the wages of
all women in contexts with more (less) extensive leave reg-
ulations (e.g. Jessen, Jessen and Kluve, 2019). These are
fruitful directions, we believe, for further inquiry.
In conclusion, large motherhood wage penalties in
Germany persisted in recent decades, up until a substan-
tial improvement in the late 2000s. Both early stability
and later improvement are here credited to the design of
parental leave policy and to the behavioural responses
parental leave provisions might have triggered. Our con-
tribution suggests that institutions may critically shape
gender economic inequality, at times maintaining it and
at times reducing it.
Supplementary Data
Supplementary data are available at ESR online.














1 The use of terms such as ‘control group’ in observa-
tional settings like ours is well-established in the rele-
vant literature (e.g. Shadish, Cook and Campbell,
2002; Francesconi and Van der Klaauw, 2007;
Gangl and Ziefle, 2015). In such observational stud-
ies, however, ‘treated’ and ‘control’ conditions are
not randomly assigned by the researcher, but rather
identified by the researcher as one in which members
of a population have/have not been exposed to some
policy or intervention. As such, we will use ‘control
group’ and ‘comparison group’ interchangeably, to
emphasise the absence of random assignment.
2 Also, using these sample selection criteria and due to
SOEP complex design (Goebel et al., 2018), East
German women make up around 12 per cent of
person-year records for women treated by Reform 1
but only 3.5 per cent from the respective control
group. This imbalance is, however, inconsequential
for our main findings.
3 Notably though, in our estimates we simply disentangle
wage responses separately by each year since first child-
birth, not depending on the timing of a woman’s re-
entry more specifically. This means that, while in Year
0 our estimation sample comprises only women who
have returned to work by that time, in Year 1 women in
the estimation sample will comprise returners in Year 0
and 1, in Year 2 returners in Years 0, 1, and 2, and so
forth. In other words, we are bound to mix women
with different timings of re-entry for our wage estimates
in the medium and long run. We do not conduct separ-
ate analyses depending on the timing of a mother’s re-
entry for two reasons, namely sample size considera-
tions and due to the endogeneity of such timing to the
design of parental leave policy itself.
4 We computed 90 per cent confidence intervals for our
wage estimates. Checking whether 90 per cent confi-
dence intervals lie entirely above (below) a certain value
would lead us to reject the hypothesis of a meaningful
effect, or smallest effect of interest (Rainey, 2014;
Bernardi, Chakhaia and Leopold, 2017; Lakens, Scheel
and Isager, 2018). Considering the wage effects of
motherhood for those women treated by Reform 2, we
typically cannot exclude penalties of around 5 per cent
in the first years after childbirth, and 10 per cent later
on. We consider penalties in this range to be of non-
negligible size, and our estimates are thus compatible
with such meaningful effects.
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